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ABSTRACT 
The bond market of China began to develop in 1981. It plays an important role 
in China's economy since the government regards bond issuance as a part of its fiscal 
and monetary policies. There are many types of bonds in China including treasury 
bonds, fiscal bonds, state construction bonds, key state construction bonds, special 
government bonds, indexed bonds, national investment bonds, key enterprise bonds, 
capital construction bonds, financial institution bonds and corporate bonds. The 
Ministry ofFinance is the largest bond issuer in China. 
Although both the primary market and the secondary market developed very 
fast in recent years, the market is still not a very healthy one. One main problem is the 
illiquidity of the secondary market. The causes behind include the inappropriate 
practices of the primary market and the under-developed market infrastructure of the 
money market. 
Besides domestic market, Chinese borrowers also participate in the 
international bond market. Although the amount of foreign debt of China is increasing, 
the situation is still manageable. Various evidences show that the Mexico-type 
financial crisis is not likely to occur in China. For foreign investor, China's 
international bonds should be a good choice in short term compared with those of the 
other developing countries. However, for a longer investment profile, some other 
factors need to be considered. 
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The People's Republic of China embarked on its current course of economic 
reforms in 1979, starting with the mral sector in which a family-based contractual 
farming system was introduced in place of the commune system. Since then, 
successful reforms have been carried out in all sectors of the economy. By October 
1992, China had made significant progress in its transition from a centrally-planned and 
closed economy to a market-oriented system, and at that date the government officially 
endorsed the market economy model. Over the past decade China has averaged an 
annual growth rate of almost 10% in real GNP, and has become one of the most 
dynamic economies in the world. 
To fund such a high rate of growth, the government's fiscal spending has been 
increasing steadily over the period. However, as the economic decentralization 
process has progressed, the absence of an appropriate taxation system and accounting 
rules have severely eroded the government's revenue base. Consequently in 1981, the 
government elected to cover part of its budgetary shortfall through government bond 
issuance, instead of relying on overdrafts from the single-bank system. Initially used 
only as a last resort, debt issuance has since been accepted, albeit gradually, as an 
important non-inflationary method of financing government expenditures. 
Objective 
The purpose of this project is to study the emerging bond market of China. 
Specifically, it attempts to answer the following questions: 
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• What is the developing process of the China's bond market? 
• What is the roles and functions of the bond market in China? 
• How many debt securities are available in China? 
• What is the current situation of the domestic and international bond markets of 
China? 
• Is ‘Mexico-type’ financial crisis likely to occur in China? 
• Is China's international bond a good investment tool for foreign investor? 
Methodology 
This thesis is constructed mainly by extensive literature review and our own 
analysis. During the research period, we searched for related materials in the libraries 
of various universities which include the Chinese University of Hong Kong, the City 
University ofHong Kong, the Hong Kong Polytechnic University and the Hong Kong 




• Academic Journals 
• Periodicals 
• Newspapers 
• Publications on statistical data 
Although we have contacted Peregrine Fixed Income Co. Ltd. and Jardine 
Fleming Co. Ltd. for relevant information, the former does not has such kind of 
information and the latter did not make any response. However, we got plenty of 
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mainland's newspaper cuttings from the relevant department of the Hong Kong and 
Shanghai Bank Corporation. Together with the daily searching of Ming Pao Daily 
News and Asian Wall Street Journal, we hope that this paper would be a complete, 
informative and up-to-date version of study on the current bond market of China. 
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CHAPTER II 
HISTORY OF THE BOND MARKET IN CHINA 
History of the Government 's Debt Issuance 
Before 1949, there were government bonds issued by the Nationalist 
government. After the PRC was established, the central government issued various 
kinds o fbonds between 1950 and 1959. For example, 'Victory Bonds' in 1950 and 
'Construction Bonds' in 1954 and 1958? After 1959, bond issuance stopped. During 
the Cultural Revolution, ‘China has neither internal debts nor external debts' was a hot 
2 • • • 
propaganda slogan. Chinese government resumed issuing bonds in 1981 because of 
the high budget deficits in the beginning of 1980s. Thereafter government bonds were 
issued every year and nowadays government bond is already the largest item in the 
financial securities market in China both in terms of quantity issued and trading 
volume. 
Starting from a 15% level in 1981, debt issuance covered more than 45% of the 
budget deficit by 1987, and in 1994, it has entirely financed the deficit. 
Correspondingly, the size of government bond issuance has grown from R M B 4.9 
billion in 1981 to R M B 100 billion in 1994. Yet when compared with developed 
countries, China's domestic debt burden is quite modest. At the end of 1993, total 
outstanding government debt was estimated to be around 55 percent of China's GNP 
for that year. Combined with a phenomenal savings rate of close to 40% of GDP, the 
potential for growth in debt issuance is enormous. Today, as China faces an acute 
‘Ho lz , Carsten. The Role of Central Banking in China's Economic Reforms. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1992, p.88. 
2 Gang, Yi. Money, Banking, and Financial Markets in China. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, 
p.259. 
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shortage o f capital to fund infrastructure development and stimulate further growth, 
bond issuance will invariable become more and more important? 
Starting from 1981, debt issuance has been increasing, from about 4 billion per 
year between 1981 to 1984 to 6 billion per year in 1985 and 1986. The issuance 
increased to 16 billion in 1987, 25 billions in 1988, 27.5 billion in 1989, 38 billions in 
1992, 37 billions in 1993 and 115 billions in 1994. The debt issuance for 1995 was 
around 154 billions. The following table shows the ratio of debt issuance to 
government expenditure between 1985 and 1995. 
Tabic IT-1: The Ratio of Government Expenditure to Debt Issuance 
Year Total Government Expenditure Debt Issuance Debt/ Expenditure 
(Y bi l l ion) (Y bi l l ion) Ratio 
1985 T84""48 8.99 4.¾'% 
1986"" 233.08 13.¾" 5.9% 
1987 244.85 " " ^ " 16.96 6.9% — 
T ^ "270T66 27^08 10.0% 
"i989 304.02 i28.3Ci 9.3% 
"l990 '345.22 "37.55 "l"o""9% 
1991 "38lT3^ : — — 46.14 T2J% 
1992 438797"……………-—_ 6 ^ ""~™"™~T^TJ^""~ 
"l993 52877 69.02 f3.'l'% 
"l"994" 58l798 117.52 20.2% 
„^^-^•^^•^^•^„•„•„„„„„„•„„„•^55^ - ' ' ' ^ [ ' " ^ - " - - - - ^ 5 ^ [~~~"""~~~~~"~24.2。/o 
Reinark : Data for 1995 are estimation 
Source : Statistical Year Book ofChina , 1995 
From the table, we see that the government Debt/Expenditure ratio is not very 
high. However, since local government is not allowed to raise debt, all the debt 
issuance shown in the table are from the central government. Therefore, the 
Debt7Expenditure of the Central Government is very high and it amounted to 39.37% 
in 1994 and 34.21% in 1995. 
The following graph visualizes the amount (in Yuan) of debt issuance by China 
government in the past ten years. 
3 "China's Emerging Securities Markcl.” Thc Columbia Journal oFWorld Business. Summer 1994, 
p . l l6 . 
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Figure II-1: China's Treasury Bond Issues 
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Reasons for the Rapid ly Increasing Debt Outs tand ing 
There are several reasons which account for the rapid increase in the debt 
outstanding of the government. These include: 
• The need to cover for the increasing government deficit. 
• Before 1993, two-third of the government deficit were subsidized by the central 
bank (The People's Bank of China). However, the subsidization of the deficit by 
over-drafting from the central bank has increased the difficulty of inflation control 
by the government. So, the Budget Law was enacted in 1994 to prohibit the 
government from borrowing from the PBC to finance fiscal deficits. Since then, 
such deficits have been covered solely through treasury bond issuance. 
• 90's is the peak period for the repayment of the debt issued and this has accounted 
for a large percentage of the government expenditure. In 1994, the revenue 
through debt issuance was 117.52 billion, in which 49.82 billion was used to repay 
^ Liu, Pei-Qiong. Zhons Giio Jing Ji Da Qii Shi 1996. Commercial Press, 1996, pp. 230-231. 
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the due debt. In 1995, the debt repayment was around 86.02 billion, 36.2 billion 
more than the previous year. Thus, the only way to fulfill the debt payment is the 
rolling-over of debt through debt issuance. However, like the rolling o f a 
snowball, the debt liabilities of the country would become larger and larger. 
Recent Development of the Bond Marke t in Ch i na 
The following table compared the size of the emerging East Asian bond market 
between 1990-1994. The market size of China's bond market is comparable to the 
other emerging markets in Asia. However, the market size is insignificant when 
compared with the other well-developed bond markets, such as Japan. 
Tabic II-2: A Comparison of thc Emerging and Wcll-Dcvclopcd Bond Markets in the World 
Country 1990 | % G D P | 1992 | % G D P | 1993 | % G D P | 1994 % G D ^ 
China 23.6 6.7 40.4 9.6 47.4~ 11.1 33.3 6.5 
Hong Kong T"."o"^—~~O 3.0 3.1 — 6.0 5.5 11.5— 8.7 
Indonesia i .7 1.6 T O J^"— 13.3 — 9.2 9.1 — 5.8 
Korea SQ2 ' '34T8""121.5 39.5 138.1 ~~41.7 161.0 42.8 
Malaysia ~^1一 6 3 ^ " 32.0 ~ l 5 . 2 35.1— 54.5 — 39.5 5 6 ~ 
Philippines ~ 8 7 ^ 9 ^ 6 " 20.5 38.7 23.7— 43.5 25.1 39.厂 
Singapoore 24.8 s X l " ^ 37.4 77.1 38.4— 69.6 —44.9 72.厂 
Thailand 8.4 “ ― 9.9 — 8.4 7.6 10.3 8.2 13.7~ 9.8 
Total 183.6 18.4 274.6 22.5 312.3— 23.8 338.0 22.Y~ 
Germany 1141.0 70.0 1420.0 72.1 1587.0 — 83.1 1 7 1 9 l 89.5 
Japan 257.6" 26.4 —247.0 23.6— 311.0 33.0 3 6 6 . ^ 35.1 
United Kingdom 2116.^ 72.2 2487.0 67.9 2887.0 — 68.5 3443.0 73.7 
United States 5168.o| 94.1 6389.0 107.6 699.3 111.7 7429.0 110.2 
Remark : Figures for industries exclude Eurobonds 
Source : The World Bank and Salomon Brothers, Inc. 
Recently, the bond market in China has undergone rapid change. The types of 
bond issued have been increasing. Besides, the method of placement has also changed 
from mandatory to the allowing of voluntary purchasing. Starting from 1988, in order 
to try to eliminate black markets, the government has allowed the trading of treasury 
bond in secondary markets. Moreover, the development of bond derivatives market 
such as the Shanghai Futures Bond Market has reduced the risk ofinvesting in bond as 
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a result o f the fluctuating bond price. All these show the efforts o f the government to 
improve the efficiency of the China bond market as a tool for resource allocation. 
The following table summarized the major events that have occurred in the 
China bond market in the past. 
Tabic II-3: Chronolo):^ y for thc Events in thc China Sccuritics Market 
Year M a j o r Events 
1981 First government's bond issue 
1988 The issuance ofindexed bond with inflation adjusted interest rate 
1988 Treasury bonds become tradable in secondary market 
1990 The establishment of the Shanghai Securities Exchange (SHSE) 
1991 The establishment of the Shenzhen Securities Exchange (SZSE) 
1992 The development oFthe Shanghai Bond Futures Exchange 
1992 SHSE launched the first bond futures contract 
The issuing of bonds and stocks to raise funds was first authorized as an 
experiment in a few cities, namely Shenyang, Shanghai, and the Guangdong province, 
and was later expanded to Beijing, Chongqing, Xiamen, and other large cities. These 
areas were chosen because of the need for enterprises in these cities to take the 
initiative to raise capital. All these areas faced a common problem: they needed to 
raise a substantial amount of funds to finance infrastructure development necessitated 
by the rapid increases in investment projects as well as to enhance their investment 
funding levels during the time that the government was reforming the fund allocation 
system under which the budgetary allocations of investment funds to enterprises were 
greatly reduced.， 
Table II-4 shows the total outstanding financial instruments and their relative 
importance in the financial markets. As expected, government bonds account for a 
major share of total securities issued during the period surveyed. At the same time, 
5 "China's Emerging Securitics Market." Thc Columbia Journal oFWorld Business, Summer 1994, 
p . l l5 . 
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corporate bonds (by state-owned, collectively owned, and private enterprises) were 
also major financial instruments in the China's market.^ 
Tabic II-4: Total Outstanding of Financial Instruments, 1981-1990 (Y billion) 
Types Amount Percent of Amount Percent of 
issued total outstanding total 
Government bonds ^ 35.7 ^ 32.5 
Financial bonds 30 18.8 25 19.4 
Construct ion bonds 8.6 5.4 8.6 6.7 
Corporate bonds 37.5 23.5 27 20.9 “ 
Other bonds 22 13.8 22 17.0 
^ o c k s 4.5 2.8 4.5 3.5 
Total 159.6 100.0 129.1 100.0 — 
Source: The Re-emerging Securities Market in China 
The following figure shows the holders of Government Bonds between 1981-
1990. 
Figure II-2: Issues ofGovcrnmcnt Bonds by Holders, 1981-1990 (in billion of Yuan) 
Treasury Bonds 
Other 
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i l H ^ # 
Enterprises 
31% 
Source : Information galhered from various sources 
We see that households were the main holders of government bonds, 
accounting for about half of the total bonds issued. Enterprises held about one-third of 
the same security while banks and non-bank financial institutions took the rest of the 
holdings. For other government bonds (construction, indexed, and other special 
government bonds), enterprises and households held roughly the same importance. 
6 "Asian bond market: A US$1 trillion calch by 2004 ？” Executive, July 1995, p.62. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE ROLES OF BOND MARKET IN CHINA'S ECONOMY 
The Tmportance of Government Securities Market for China 's Development 
The government securities market is important for at least three reasons. First, 
it is a means of imposing fiscal discipline on the government. To begin, government 
securities must be sold to the public if the central bank is committed to a policy of not 
monetizing the deficit. In this case, the willingness of the private sector to absorb 
government debt is a constraint on fiscal policy. Thus, the primary market for 
government securities is an important disciplinary force in the move away from a 
planning structure and towards a modern market economy. 
Second, the secondary market in government securities market can provide the 
whole financial system with a market determined benchmark interest rate. Government 
securities are a homogeneous financial instrument with risk characteristics that are easy 
to understand. I f secondary market trading is active and the markets are liquid, then 
the interest rate on government bonds provides a benchmark for all financial 
transactions. This is particularly important if competition in the determination of bank 
deposit and loan rates is restricted. 
Finally, the existence of a government securities market enables the central 
bank to broaden the set of monetary policy tools to include open market operations. 
Although open market operations can be conducted without a deep securities market 
or with assets other than government securities, a functioning secondary market for 
government securities facilitates policy operations. 
11 
Fiscal Management 
The role of capital market in China's financial sector is small relative to the 
banking system, but has been growing. Total assets of non-monetary financial 
institutions grew from 6 percent in 1989 to a high o f 8 percent in 1992, o f the financial 
sector's assets, declining once again to 5 percent by 1994. 
The following figure shows the contribution of various bond issues to cover for 
the central government budgetary deficit. 
Figure ni-l: The Contribution of Bond Tssucs to thc Government's Budgetary Deficit 
120%n ^ ^ ^ H 
100。/。 ^ ^ ^ ^ H ^ ^ ™ _ 
. - 1 • 邏 ^ M ^ 
o 60% - ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ H ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ H ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 9 
:.^^^穩曜霞 
o . ± i ^ ^ ^ ^ B * ^ ^ ^ r 
1988 1 989 1 990 1 991 1992 1 993 
E3 Net treasury bills issues � Net treasury by^cfifesues • Overseas Sovereign Bond Issues 
Sixty percent of PBC lending to the banking sector is estimated to cover the 
financing of ‘policy loans', the (consolidated) deficit increases, and the size of annual 
treasury bond issues compared to the (consolidated) deficit increases, and the size of 
annual treasury bond issues compared to the (consolidated) deficit consequently falls. 
The annual volume of net treasury bonds issued over 1989 to 1993 has varied between 
11 and 23 percent of the consolidated deficit, while the annual volume of treasury bills 
alone has varied between 5 and 23 percent of the consolidated deficit. I f quasi-fiscal 
12 
operations are 'fiscalized', an increase in the scale of bond issues is likely to be 
required. 
Recently, the government has increased the amount ofbond issues to cover for 
the government budget. In 1993, the government has issued about US$600 million 
sovereign bond and US$1.6 billion in 1994. I f these are added to the measures o f the 
relative size of government bond issues and the budget deficit, the role o f securities 
markets increases; to around 38 percent in 1993 (33 percent from domestic bond 
issues, and another 5 percent from overseas issues)? 
Bond Financing o fRea l Sector Investment 
The contributions of securities markets in general, to the investment need of the 
real sectors of the economy, has been small. The following figure shows the 
contribution of capital markets to real sector investment. 
Figure III-2: Thc Contribution of Bond and Securities Markets to the Rcal Sector's Investment 
35] 肩 
30- y r W 
-- ^ . < m ^ j ^ i l _ 
i ： | ^ U | i 
: J l J i i i i ^ 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Year 
S Treasury bond ® Investment bond • Enterprise bond m Equity 
42 World Bank. The Emerging Asian Bond Market: China. Washington, D.C.: World Bank 
Publication, June 1995, pp. 20-21. 
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From the figure, the total contribution of bonds to SOU investment ranged 
from 8% to 21%. After 1993, there was a clampdown on the issue of new corporate 
debt, which would have led to a reduction in this percentage. 
In terms of aggregate contributions of foreign resource inflows into China, 
international securities issues still account for a small share of China's total external 
debt. The bulk of foreign capital inflows into China have taken the form of foreign 
direct investment. Portfolio equity only constituted 5.5% of aggregate net resource 
flows to China in 1993, and bonds accounted for only 2.7% of new borrowing 
commitments in 1993. 
However, the contribution of capital markets to resource inflows to the real 
sectors of the economy is embedded within the mechanisms of the investment and 
credit plans. Thus, the extent to which the capital markets contribute is largely 
determined by the extent to which the government permits them to contribute, and the 
issuers of securities are determined by the distribution of quotas for each of these 
heads by the central and regional offices ofSPC, PBC and SAEC.^ 
42 World Bank. The Emerging Asian Bond Market: China. Washington, D.C.: World Bank 
Publication, June 1995, pp. 20-21. 
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CHAPTER IV 
TYPES OF DEBT SECURITIES IN CHINA 
Government Bonds 
Treasury Bonds 
Treasury bonds were first issued in 1981 by the Minister ofFinance (MOF) for 
financing the state budget. The PBC is responsible for the management of the treasury 
bonds. Specialized banks and other financial institutions are then entrusted by the PBC 
to handle transactions of treasury bonds. The interest of treasury bonds is calculated 
based on simple rate. 
Between 1981 and 1984, the treasury bonds issued had the same scheme of 
maturity which was within the range of 5 to 10 years. Ironically, the maturity of 
individual issuance was determined by random drawing, this reflected that the Chinese 
government lacked a comprehensive financial planning at that time. The MOF started 
to pay back the principle plus interest in the sixth year after issuance. Each year 20 
percent of the holders were repaid. It means the last 20 percent were redeemed in the 
tenth year. The interest rates of the bonds issued in that period were 4 percent and 8 
percent for institutional holders and individual holders respectively. 
From 1985 to 1987, the treasury bonds issued had a uniform maturity of 5 
years. It was shortened to 3 years after 1988. The interest rates were 5 percent for 
institutions and 9 percent for individuals in 1985, 6 percent and 10 percent for the 
period o f l986 to 1988. Then, started from 1989, the interest rates for institutions and 
individuals were unified. A unifonn rate of 14 percent was offered in 1989 and 1990. 
In 1991, the interest rate was declined to 10 percent and the volume of issuance had 
9 Gang, Yi. Money, Banking, and Financial Markets in China. Boulder: Westview Press 1994 
p.260. ， ， 
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doubled compared with 1990. Then from 1992, the number of issuance was not 
confined to once each year. There were two issuances of treasury bonds both in 1992 
and 1993. It was further increased to 4 issuances in 1994. Furthermore the maturity 
ofthe treasury bonds in 1994 was more various, ranged from 6 months to 3 years. 
Within the period from 1981 to 1994, the total amount of treasury bonds issued 
was around 242 billion yuan.'^ Table IX-1 summarizes the treasury bonds issued from 
1981 to 1994. 
In 1995, China issued roughly 154 billion yuan worth of treasury bonds which 
was about 4 percent of the GDP of the same year. That year, Chinese government 
repaid 87 billion yuan outstanding treasury bonds." 
The issuance of treasury bonds continues in 1996. In January and February, 
the M O F already issued 13.5 billion yuan and 21 billion yuan of discount bonds 
• 12 1 飞 
respectively. In April, 10 billion yuan discounted certificate bonds was issued also. 
Besides, China will issue a record 195.26 billion yuan in government treasury bonds in 
1996. Most of the planned issue will cover repayment of 133.17 billion yuan in 
principal and interest on outstanding government bonds that fall due this year, while 
61.44 billion yuan will cover the deficit in the central government budget for 1996. 
The remaining 646 million yuan from the planned bond issue will be used to repay 
foreign loans on major construction p r o j e c t s , 
10 Zhang, Yi-Chen, and Yii, Da. ''China's Emerging Securities Market." The Columbia Journal of 
World Business. Summer 1994, p. 116. 
1】Blass, Anthony. "Cliimi,s Fledgling Bond Market." China Banking & Finance, 1 November 1995, 
p.2. 
'^ Hastings, Kirsti. “Cliina to Launch Debt-Market Reform." Asian Wall Street Journal. 9 February 
1996. 
B Dow Jones. "China Bond Issiic.” Asian Wall Street Journal. 28 March 1996. 
M Flint, Robert. “China Plans to Issue $23.57 Billion in Treasury Bonds in '96, a Record.” Asian 
Wall Street Journal. 
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At the beginning, trading of treasury bonds was not allowed. However, 
secondary market was created and trading of treasury bonds was legalized in the 
second half of the 1980s, ln April o f l 988 , with State Council approval treasury bonds 
held by individuals became negotiable. Trading was initially permitted experimentally 
in seven cities, but only for those issued in 1985 and 1986. Then in June 1988, the 
trading network was extended to 63 c i t i es . 
Fiscal Bonds 
Fiscal bonds was created in 1988 for financing budget deficit.^^ This type of 
bond was issued by MOF and managed by PBC. They were allocated to banks and 
other financial institutions by mandatory method. Their maturity ranged from 2 to 5 
years. Although they were not tradable, they could be pledged. The amount issued in 
the first year was 6.6 billion yuan. By the end of 1990, totally 13.716 billion yuan 
worth of fiscal bonds were issued." The 1988 issue matured in 1991 but nevertheless 
have not been redeemed. It is regarded as a permanent loan by the MOF. Starting 
from 1994, no fiscal bond was issued, that showed MOF's intention to terminate this 
species ofbond. 
State Construction Bonds 
It was a special security issued first in 1988 by MOF to public, financial 
institutions and enterprises for financing SOEs and infrastructure. The first issue was 
15 World Bank. China Financial Sector Policies and Institutional Development. Washington, D.C.: 
World Bank Publication, 1990, p.l()6. 
16 Holz, Carsten. The Role of Central Banking in China's Economic Reforms. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1992, p.89. 
� Gang, Yi. Money, Banking, and Financial Markets in China. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, 
pp.260-261. ’ 
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3.065 billion yuan in amount.^^ Besides, the State Construction Bonds were tradable 
and for individual holders they were income tax exempt. 
Key State Construct ion Bonds 
It was issued between 1981 and 1987 by the M O F through the People's 
Construction Bank of China for financing key state construction projects. In 1987, 5.5 
billion yuan worth ofkey state construction bonds were issued.^^ 
Special Government Bonds 
The M O F created special government bonds in 1989. Their creation aimed at 
distinguishing treasury bills issued to individuals and those issued to institutions. The 
first issue was worth 4.3 billion yuan and the bonds were assigned to profitable SOEs, 
collectively owned enterprises, private enterprises, pension funds, insurance 
companies, etc. The yield of the first issue was 15 percent and the maturity was 5 
years. In 1990, totally 3.24 billion yuan worth of special government bonds were 
issued.2G They were not tradable but were interest-tax exemptable. Finally, the Special 
Government Bonds merged with fiscal bonds in 1992. 
Indexed Bonds 
In order to curb inflation and to reduce demand in the economy, the MOF 
invented indexed bonds in 1989. The bonds were issued to urban and rural residents, 
private companies, insurance companies and various fund foundations. The term of 
maturity of the bonds was 3 years. The yield of the bond was equal to the floating rate 
18 
Holz, Carsten. The Role of Central Banking in China's Economic Reforms. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1992, p.89. 
19 Holz, Carsten. The Role of Central Banking in China's Economic Reforms. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1992. p.89. 
20 Gang, Yi. Money, Banking, and Financial Markets in China. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, 
p.261. ’ ， 
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of three-year time deposit announced by the PBC plus the value-guarantee subsidy 
and an additional one percentage point. Specialized banks and post offices around the 
country were responsible for promoting the bonds. A sales target was assigned to each 
province and the local governments needed to buy the remaining bonds by using local 
funds in case they could not meet the sales quota. Similar bonds were also issued in 
199222，1994 and 1995. 
National Investment Bonds 
With the approval of SPC, provincial governments started to issue national 
investment bonds in 1991. The fund raised was used to finance regional development. 
State Investment Corporat ion Bonds 
These bonds are formally issued by SOEs or governmental agencies^^ and thus 
carry a semi-official property. They were used to supplement general revenues of 
enterprises and supplement their budgetary financial support. 
Key Enterprise Bonds 
It was first issued in 1987 by SOEs in electrical, metallurgical, nonferrous and 
petrochemical industries to client enterprises mandatorily. They were guaranteed by 
the state government and serviced by PCBC. They could be pledged. The maturity 
ranged from 3 to 15 years. In 1987 and 1988, 3 billion yuan and 1 billion yuan worth 
ofkey enterprise bonds were issued respect ively? 
2】Value-guarantee subsidy was an indexing scheme linked to inflation rate. 
22 Wilh maturity of3 years and 5 years. 
23 Or by MOF on thcir bchalf. 
24 Holz, Carsten. The Rolc of Central Banking in China's Economic Reforms. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1992, p.89. 
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Capi ta l Construct ion Bonds 
Eight billion yuan worth of capital construction bonds were first issued in 1988 
by the State Energy Investment Corporation, the State Transport Investment 
Corporation and the State Transit Railway. The bonds were administrated by PCBC 
and were primarily distributed to specialized banks at an annual rate o f 7.5 percent 
with a maturity of 5 years. By the end of 1990, the amount ofissuance was 9.5 billion 
yuan.25 
Financial Institution Bonds 
Being self-explained, these bonds are issued by financial institutions. As a 
result o f the nation-wide financial reforms, the distribution of funds between the 
Central Bank and the various specialized banks was changed that their relationships 
became lending-borrowing one. To supplement their loanable funds, specialized banks 
can attract more deposits, borrow from the central bank or issue financial instruments 
such as CDs and bonds. For non-bank financial institutions such as trust and 
investment companies, they are also allowed to issue bonds to finance their special 
investment projects. Usually, the approved projects are large infrastructure projects or 
projects involved advanced technology and foreign capital. 
In 1985, the Agricultural Bank of China issued 1.5 billion yuan worth of bank 
bonds with the same yield as treasury bonds^^ Two years later. The Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China offered one billion yuan worth bonds to the public with the 
same interest rate. Until 1988, state-owned banks have issued a total of 8.5 billion 
yuan worth ofbank bonds. The amount was increased to around 33 billion yuan by the 
^ c 
‘Gang , Yi. Money, Bankina. and Financial Markets in China. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, 
p.261. 
26 The yield of the treasury bonds in 1985 was 9 percent. 
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end ofl991.27 ]n July 1993, PBC issued 20 billion yuan worth ofbonds with maturity 
of 3，6 and 9 months. The bonds were placed through inter-bank centers to 
redistribute bank excess reserves. The proceeds was utilized to lend to banks and 
0 Q 
NBFIs in regions where reserves were not enough. 
Unlike treasury bonds, financial institution bonds pay annual interest. They are 
tradable and usually with a maturity of one to five years. 
Corporate Bonds 
Corporate bonds were first issued in 1982. These bonds became popular fund 
raising apparatus in 1985, particularly among rural enterprises because at that time the 
Beijing government tightened the strategy of making bank loans to rural factories to 
cool the overheated economy. As a result of the financial reforms in China, investment 
funds to enterprises from budgetary allocations were significantly reduced. Moreover, 
many newly established small-scale enterprises not even eligible for such allocation 
from the government. Therefore enterprises needed to raise funds by their own and so 
they issued bonds to the public. Usually, corporate bonds offer coupon rates which 
doubled those offered by banks. This makes corporate bonds a very attractive 
investment tool and thus many people withdrew their bank deposits and put them into 
the corporate bond market. 
By the end of 1988, a total of 14 billion yuan worth of corporate bonds was 
issued. The figure bloomed to about 16.5 billion yuan by the end of 1991.^^ To 
restrict the issuance of corporate bonds, the Chinese government promulgated a 
number of regulations soon after. For example, a maximum of 20 percent above bank 
27 Hu, Yebi. China,s Capital Market. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1993, pp.8-9. 
28 World Bank. The Emergina Asian Bond Market: China. Washington, D.C.: World Bank 
Publication, June, 1995, p. 10. 
29 Hu, Yebi. China's Capital Market. Hong Kong: The Chinese Universily Press, 1993, p.8. 
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interest rate was set as the ceiling for the coupon rates of corporate bonds. 




THE DOMESTIC BOND MARKET 
Primary Market 
Issuers 
In the China domestic bond market, only the MOF is a regular issuer. Other 
big borrowers include state-owned enterprises and financial institutions. Except MOF, 
other issuers need to apply for debt issuance quotas every year from the relevant 
government agencies, usually the State Planning Commission (SPC) and the PBC. The 
government agencies will spread the limited quota around. By far, the largest issuer is 
the MOF and thus treasury bonds are the largest issue type. Between January 1981 
and December 1993, treasury bonds accounted for 282 billion yuan among the 544 
billion yuan of all bonds issued. In order to reduce confusion, the MOF simplified the 
bond types by gradually decreasing the fiscal and special government bond issues in 
recent years. Finally, in 1994, the MOF issued treasury bonds only. 
Issue Procedure of Government Bonds 
The methods used to issue government bonds have been evolved from an 
administered placement method to a more market-oriented approach. Until 1991， 
treasury bonds were placed with enterprises and individuals entirely on a mandatory 
basis. Basically, each year the MOF fixed the proportion ofbonds to be allocated at 
the provincial level for the coming year to individuals, groups and institutions. The 
pattern of allocation was typically fixed based on the total payroll, the savings rate and 
the general economic conditions of different provinces. Then, each provincial finance 
bureau decided how to allocate the bonds within the province. At the local level, 
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quotas were distributed among production units. In turn, each unit assigned the bonds 
to its workers. Practically, allocations to individuals were often carried out by 
deducting their pay, while allocations to enterprises were achieved by withholding the 
amounts from their bank accounts. 
In April 1991, the MOF for the first time experimentally adopted an 
underwriting syndicate of securities dealers to launch a bond issue on an voluntary 
basis. The syndicate was entrusted with the issue of 2.5 billion yuan, out of the total 
19.9 billion yuan worth of treasury bonds issued in that year. A private agency, the 
Securities Exchange Executive Council (SEEC) acted as coordinator of the 
underwriting which involved 58 financial institutions. The underwriters received a 
commission of 0.15 percent of the underwritten amount and sold the bonds on a 
voluntary basis to clients. The practice was so successful that the MOF adopted it on a 
larger scale in 1992 for the issuance in which underwriting syndicate responsible to 
distribute 3.6 billion yuan worth of treasury bonds. In the same year, the traditional 
administrative allocation was still the main issuing method which accounted for 36.7 
billion yuan worth of treasury bonds. The relative success of underwriting in 1991 and 
1992 could be partly attributed to the relatively attractive coupon offered on the 
treasury bonds compared with other available investment tools. 
In 1993, due to competition from the booming equity and property markets and 
higher returns on enterprise debt, underwriting syndicate failed to form because the 
securities dealers believed that the yield of treasury bonds was too low to attract 
enough investors. Therefore the MOF had to revert to mandatory allocations to 
distribute the bonds in that year. 
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The bond market revived in 1994 when a new distribution system was 
implemented. Under the new structure, PBC has become responsible for the placing o f 
all treasury bonds. The PBC also acted as the chief coordinator to organize a national 
underwriting syndicate to handle all government bond issues. The underwriting 
syndicate comprised more than 40 government bond primary dealers, each of them 
needed to distribute at least one percent of each issue in order to hold their primary 
dealer status. These dealers were typically experienced and well-capitalized bank 
subsidiaries and securities firms. They were chosen jointly by the MOF , the PBC and 
the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Each member was then 
responsible to distribute the bonds to the investors through thousands of their branches 
and outlets all over the country. 
For the year 1994, the treasury bonds were issued in 4 different periods and 4 
issue methods were utilized. First, 13 billion yuan worth of paperless treasury bonds 
with maturity of 6-month and 1 -year were issued via underwriting agreements. The 
*, 
underwriters which mainly formed by designated primary dealers were given one week 
to place the debt. Afterwards, the debt was listed on the Shanghai stock exchange. 
Second, 28 billion yuan of two year bearer treasury bonds were sold through local 
financial department. The local financial departments signed 'underwriting 
agreements' with local financial institutions which then sold the bonds to individuals 
and other entities. Third, 2 billion yuan of five-year bearer treasury bonds were 
assigned directly to institutions. Finally, the largest part of the year's issue, 70 billion 
yuan worth of treasury bonds with maturity of three years were allocated by PBC to 
the headquarters of the specialized banks which in turn distributed them to provincial 
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and local levels. These bonds were redeemable at the bank of issue after six months. 
However, they were not tradable. 
For the underwriting method of 1994, underwriters were supposed to compete 
for an allocation of treasury bonds through a three-part bid covering: the amount to be 
underwritten, the speed at which funds received from the sale of treasury bonds would 
be repatriated back to government and the underwriting fee. For the first time, the 
target market was wholesale rather than retail. However, this method accounted for 
only 11.7 percent of the year's issue, even less than the 12.5 percent placed by 
underwriting in 1991. There were some difficulties to move away from administrative 
placement system. First, within the framework of the credit plan, the fulfillment of 
placement quotas could no longer be assured. Second, the coupon rate of the treasury 
bonds were not competitive for underwriters and primary dealers. Third, institutional 
buyers are not at present accustomed to government bond purchase. 
In 1995, China issued one-year treasury bonds for the first time using auction 
method. The volume was 1 1.6 billion yuan. For this issue, no physical bond paper 
was printed. Ownership registration, clearing and transaction can be done through 
computer systems which connected the Shanghai, Shenzhen, Wuhan and Tianjin 
securities exchanges and the STAQS. This method ofbond issuance can increase the 
efficiency of treasury bond issuance, decrease the costs in certificate printing, 
transportation and destroying. 
Issue Procedure of Non-Government Bonds 
The distribution of non-government bonds does not need to resort to 
mandatory allocation. Local state-enterprises can issue bonds with the approval of the 
local State Planning Council and the local PBC, which will then allocate the quota to 
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the locality according to the credit plan. The PBC head office is responsible to 
supervise the aggregate volume of enterprise bonds issues. The allocation o f the quota 
between enterprises is based on financial and political criteria. An acceptable rating by 
a credit rating agency is necessary. Practically, the priorities o f industrial policy are 
also very important. For both enterprise bonds and financial institution bonds, they are 
often sold to individual investors locally through retail branches ofbanks and securities 
firms. These non-government bonds are more popular than the government 
counterparts because investors are attracted by the higher rates offered on these bonds. 
Furthermore, the smaller sizes of these issues make them more suitable to be 
distributed through a retail network. 
Issue Characteristics 
The sale of treasury bonds using paperless method permitted a much shorter 
issue period. Thus in 1994 the two paperless issues took less than a week each.^^ But 
the two-year bearer issue took two months to place^^ and the three-year treasury bill 
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certificate took even longer, four months' . For the paperless issues, the underwriters 
needed to sell the bills within a specified period. At the end of the period, the 
underwriters had to remit the funds and the unsold subscriptions to the MOF. The 
issues were then declared tradable immediately. For the two- and three-year treasury 
bills, funds raised were remitted to the MOF's account at the PBC by each 
underwriter, according to the terms of their individual underwriting agreements, rather 
than on a daily basis. The final payment was made after the closure of the issue period. 
30 The six month paperless issue was placed between January 25 and January 31, and the one year 
paperless issue was placed between February 1 and 3. 
31 From 1 April to 31 May. 
32 From 1 April to 30 July. 
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Generally, the size, interest rate, maturity and other terms of each bond issue 
have to get approval froin the State Council which in turn would consult the PBC. 
Until 1984, the maturity of treasury bonds issued was 10 years. Since then, the M O F 
attempted to make treasury bonds more attractive by shortening the maturity to 5 years 
and then 3 years. And in 1994, treasury bonds with maturity of 6 months, one year 
and 2 years appearecp3 
Typically, government bonds are issued at par and they usually carry a 
predetermined coupon. Before 1995, no auction process was used to determine the 
yield in the primary market. Coupon rates of treasury bonds were set at about 150bp 
to 200bp above the rates on savings deposits of comparable maturity without reference 
to the secondary market yield. This reveals the administratively determined interest 
rate structure and the role of debt issues plays in the Credit Plan. The rates on fiscaI 
bonds, however, may be below the deposit rates, and the rates on special government 
bonds were sometimes pegged to an inflation index. Besides, the five-year 1993 issue 
and the scripless issue of 1994 which pay an annual coupon, coupon on treasury bonds 
was paid in full at redemption. Coupon was paid in a lump at maturity rather than 
being compounded. This is because majority bonds were issued to individuals in bearer 
form with small denominations，which made it difficult to pay intervening coupon. In 
addition, this style of coupon payment made it more likely that the treasury bonds 
would trade in the secondary market at a price above par. In such a less sophisticated 
market this assisted primary sales；^^  
”See Table IX-1. 
34 World Bank. The Emerging Asian Bond Market: China. Washington, D.C.: World Bank 
Publication, June 1995, p.l4. 
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As explained before, until 1989 the coupon on treasury bonds sold by 
mandatory placement to institutions was less than that on treasury bonds sold to 
individuals. The rates are summarized in Table V-1. The difference was abolished 
since 1989. 
Tabic V-1: Comparison of Coupon on Treasury Bills Sales by Purchaser 
Year Households Enterprises 
198 2 8 4 
1983 8 4 — 
1984 8 4 
1985 9 5 — 
1986 10 6 
1987 10 6 — 
1988 10 6 — 
1989" 14 15 
1990" 14 15 
1991" 10 9 — 
Source: IMF(1991) 
a Rate on special state bonds given for enterprises. 
Enterprise and financial bonds are different from government bonds that they 
employed both annual coupon and lump coupon payment methods. The ceiling of the 
coupon on enterprise bonds is set at 20 percent above the deposit rate. In addition, the 
M O F does not allow the coupon of non-government bonds to exceed that on treasury 
bills in order to reduce competitive pressure on treasury bill sales. However, by 
offering a lower fee and discounts, the corporate bonds usually result in a coupon two 
to three percent more than that of the treasury bill. 
Interest Rate Subsidy 
One special feature of the China's treasury bond is the attachment of interest 
rate subsidy. Let us go into some details about this. 
Interest rate subsidy was first introduced in 1988 so as to ease inflation. That 
year, because of the rapid price reform, nation-wide wave of inflation was initiated. 
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Therefore, the government introduced the interest rate subsidy. According to the price 
index, which is disclosed regularly, the Central Bank determined the rate of subsidy. 
The subsidy rate was applied to three-year or longer fixed bank deposit and treasury 
bonds. The interest rate subsidy aims at stabilizing the saving of citizens, forbidding 
them from injecting too much money into the market. It was abolished in late 1991 but 
reused in 1993 when inflation increased. 
For treasury bonds with maturity shorter than 3 years, interest rate subsidy was 
not applied. Therefore, short-tenn bonds were a less expensive means for the state to 
raise fund. On the contrary, long-term bond is a great burden to the MOF since the 
interest rate subsidy greatly increases the amount of repayment. 
In December 1995, the interest rate subsidy rate reached its peak of 13.24 
percent. It had declined to 10.83 percent in February 1996. As a result of the macro-
economic control, inflation was significantly reduced and stabilized in 1996. 
Therefore, started from 1 April 1996, interest rate subsidy was abolished. 
Credit Rating Agencies 
Since 1991, the central government has been encouraging the development of 
credit rating agencies. To disclose their rating, rating agencies must get approval from 
the PBC beforehand. However, up to now, only two rating agencies were approved 
by the headquarters of the PBC. In addition, some other agencies were also approved 
at a local level. Overall, 82 credit rating companies were approved. Amongst, about 
30 operate at a national level. 
Quite confusing, some of the rating agencies called themselves accounting firm 
or consultant firm rather than credit-rating agencies. Furthermore, the ownership 
structures of those companies are diverse, showing the variety of entry points into the 
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new industry. In reality, some regional rating companies are subsidiaries of the local 
PBC. O f the two credit rating companies in Shanghai, one is a subsidiary of the 
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences and the other is a subsidiary o f the Shanghai 
University Institute ofFinance and Trade. 
Theoretically speaking, rating agencies should help to distinguish the poorly 
performing companies from those with acceptable performance. Then, according to 
the rating, the PBC and SPC can grant the bond issue quota to suitable enterprises, and 
investors can make their smart investment decisions. But in China, the role o f rating 
agencies is marginal. The PBC and SPC make the decision of issue quota allocation 
mainly based on state policy rather than the companies' credit rating. Moreover, 
investors do not place enough concern on the rating because state-owned enterprises 
rarely fail and investors have excess investible funds on hand. 
Secondary Market 
Development of Spot Market 
During 1981 when government bonds reappeared in China, private transaction 
of the bonds was regarded as illegal behavior. With more and more government bonds 
being issued, the demand for a secondary market increased. On August 5, 1986，the 
Shengyang city branch of the PBC approved a request of the Shengyang Investment 
and Trust Inc. to open a business counter for transactions of financial securities. By 
the end of 1987, there were many brokerage companies, investment and trust firms, 
and credit unions providing financial securities exchange business in 41 cities around 
the country. In April 1988, the State Council approved the secondary markets for 
government bonds on a trial basis. The first group of experimental secondary markets 
were established in Shengyang, Shanghai, Chongqing, Wuhan, Canton, Harbin, and 
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Shenzhen. In June of 1988, there were another 54 cities that got approval to start 
secondary markets. The existence of secondary markets for government bonds enable 
individuals to cash in their holdings before maturity and make the bonds attractive 
investment for those individuals with liquid savings. The PBC approved the 
establishment of34 financial securities firms during the same year.^^ 
In 1988, treasury bonds issued to individuals in 1985 and 1986 became tradable 
to accommodate early redemption since the government wanted to eliminate the black 
markets for these bonds. Until 1991, trading in treasury bonds was conducted 
exclusively in the over-the-counter (OTC) market. Due to the lack of a nation-wide 
network, this OTC market was characterized by significant price differentials across 
regions, reflecting different supply-demand conditions and expense involved in moving 
paper from one market to another. At that time, demand appeared stronger in 
Shanghai than to other cities. Some Shanghai securities firms thus tried to earn 
arbitrary profits by establishing channels to buy bonds at lower prices in other cities for 
resale in Shanghai. Municipal authorities generally disapproved of this as it represents 
a net outflow of funds. 
The development of the securities market had a significant breakthrough in 
1990. In February, Shanghai and Chongqing started to allow treasury bonds issue in 
1987 and 1988 to be traded in the market. In May, more than 20 provinces and cities 
approved the legal trading of treasury bonds issued from 1982 to 1988. In some 
coastal cities, treasury bonds issued in 1989 were also allowed to enter the market. 
More tender price fluctuation was one significant improvement in 1990. After large-
scale secondary markets were opened, combining with the decreasing interest rates 
-^^  Gang, Yi. Monev. Banking, and Financial Markets in China. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, 
pp.261-262. 
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trend and an easing of inflationary expectations, there was a steady price increase for 
the government securities. The effective yields of government securities were close to 
the return on time deposits with equivalent maturity terms. 
Another significant event in 1990 was the establishment of the nationwide 
information and exchange network. Before that, there was notable price differentials 
across cities because of different supply-demand conditions in different cities. A 
preliminary uniform national market enabled the prices on government securities, 
especially on treasury bonds, to converge in different regions. 
Then in 1994, in order to enhance the liquidity of the bond market, several 
reform measures were implemented. First, in addition to the responsibility to distribute 
treasury bonds in the primary market, the designated primary dealers are required to 
maintain a certain trading volume in the secondary market. These dealers are also 
expected to co-operate with the PBC in the course of the conduct of open market 
operations. Second, all tradable treasury bonds issued this year are registered on the 
SHSE book-entry system to facilitate centralized clearing of all treasury bond sales. 
This is the first step toward eliminating the inefficiencies and inconveniences 
associated with trading bearer-form bonds/^^ 
Development of Futures and Repurchase Markets 
Besides the spot market, there are bond futures and repurchase markets. The 
first bond futures contract was launched on December 28, 1992. The market started 
to really operate at the end of 1993. The trading volume ofbond futures contract was 
sluggish at the beginning, but became quite active afterward. Since 1993 and 1994, 
36 Zhang, Yi-Chen, and Yu. Da. Thirm,s Emerging Securities Market." The Columbia Journal of 
World Business, Summer 1994, p l l3 . 
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bond futures were traded on SHSE and SZSE respectively. These two exchanges are 
the main floor for bond futures trading afterward. Bond futures contract provides a 
full set ofhedging vehicles and various synthetic short-term instruments for investors. 
Facing the high-inflation environment and the existence of interest rate subsidy, 
individuals used futures to speculate against the inflation. Therefore, the trading 
volume o fbond futures in the last couple of years climbed to an unprecedented high 
level. The bloom of bond futures market in turn led to increased liquidity o f the 
underlying security. However, because of an illegal incidence occurred in 1995, the 
trading ofbond futures was suspended in May 18, 1995. 
The government securities repurchase market exists in some rudimentary forms 
in both SHSE and STAQS. In SHSE, repurchase agreements are standardized one-
month, three-month, and six-month term contracts, whereas in STAQS, they are 
typically structured to suit both buyers and sellers. 
Trading Centres 
Shanghai, Shenzhen, STAQS and Wuhan are the four principal bond markets in 
China. Besides, there are many regional markets whose sizes are relative small 
comparatively. By the end of 1992, China had more than 85 professional security-
exchange brokerage companies, over 1200 trust and investment firms.^^ The number 
ofbrokerage branches of securities firms through which investors all over the country 
participate in the market had grown to over 3,000 by the end of 1 9 9 3 严 
37 Gang, Yi. Monev. Banking, and Financial Markets in China. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994， 
p.259. 
38 Zhang, Yi-Chen, and Yu, Da.、、China，s Emerging Securities Market." The Columbia Journal of 
World Business, Summer 1994. p. l l6. 
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SHSE is the first stock exchange of the PRC. The PBC approved its 
establishment on November 26, 1990 whereas its grand opening was on December 19, 
1990. SHSE is a non-profit legal entity organized generally by following the 
international standard for a stock exchange. Besides providing a physical space for 
securities trading, SHSE is responsible for organizing and managing transactions 
among traders, providing securities trading information, approving or disapproving o f 
application of securities to be traded in it, organizing the trading and settlement 
process, etc. By late 1990, the daily trading volume of bonds on SHSE was on 
average 950,000 y u a n ? At the beginning of 1991, there were 31 securities traded in 
the SHSE, among which 6 were government bonds, 9 were financial bonds, 8 were 
corporate bonds and 8 were stocks.]() Compared with other exchanges, SHSE is more 
advanced that it has a system using magnetic cards for record-keeping and for 
transaction of securities. The cards are mainly used for equity transactions. However, 
the scripless treasury bills issued in 1994 can also be traded through this system. 
STAQS is a centralized securities trading system established on December 5, 
1990. Being centred in Beijing, STAQS utilizes a telecommunication network which 
allows instantaneous trading of treasury bonds via computer. Users can get immediate 
price quotation and trade through party-to-party negotiations. Up to 1993, there were 
eighteen securities finns and state-investment corporations in Beijing, Shanghai, 
Shenyang, Wuhan, Guangzhou and Haikou participated in the STAQS. The STAQS 
plays a vital role in providing timely and accurate market information, faster order 
entry and execution, more efficient and reliable clearing and settlement, and more 
39 Holz, Carslcn. The Role ofCcnlral Banking in China's Economic Reforms. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1992, p.86. 
如 Gang, Yi. Monev. Bankin&. and Financial Markets in China. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, 
p.268. 
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effective regulation. The establishment of STAQS helps to end the fragmented status 
of China's securities market, facilitate the development of a nationwide securities 
market, and create a desirable securities-trading environment in the futures. 
SZSE was established in July 1991. It has been active in developing a bond 
market since late 1993. The Wuhan, Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges have an 
estimated common membership of 100-150 brokers. Many of these brokers belong to 
STAQS. Each of the four principle exchanges has satellite links which provide 
members across the country with real-time quotation and transaction data. Order 
placement and confirmation is by telephone or fax on the SHSE, at Wuhan, and on 
STAQS. Besides STAQS, no exchanges has developed electronic over-the-counter 
trade. 
Trading Volume and Liquid i ty 
In 1988, total transactions in the security markets were 2.63 billion. Amongst, 
92.1 percent were treasury bonds, 4.4 percent corporate bonds, 2.6 percent financial 
institution bonds, 1.4 percent key state construction bonds, and 0.5 percent bank CDs 
in large denominations. The volume of security trading in 1989 declined by 12 percent 
to 2.3 billion yuan. One of the reasons for the decrease is the negative effect induced 
by the June 4th Tiananmen Square incidence. Another reason is that no new treasury 
bonds were allowed to be traded in 1989. Market trading of treasury bonds was 
restricted to those issued in 1985 and 1986 o n l y . Then, the secondary treasury bond 
market revived and, within one year time, the trading volume increased more than 5 
folds from 2.1 billion to 11.6 billion yuan. The trading volume of treasury bond then 
41 Gang,Yi. Moncv. BankinR, and Financial Markets in China. Boulder: WestviewPress, 1994, 
p.262. 
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increased continuously with a peak of 108 billion yuan in 1992 (see Table IX-2). The 
decline in 1993 was due to the higher return of equity and real estate markets. As a 
result, capital was diverted into those attractive sectors. 
Compared with equity, the secondary bond market in China was not liquid 
enough. In 1993, the volume of equity trading was equal to 25 times of volume on 
issue. But for bond, the ratio of trading volume to volume outstanding was less than 
one. Although equity only accounted for less than one-tenth of securities on issue in 
that year, the value of equity trade was 5 times as debt. In early 1995, because of the 
heat of bond futures, the liquidity of the spot bond market was also increased (see 
Table V-2 and IX-3). 
Table V-2: The Situation of China's Bond Market 
Types Items 1994 1995' 
Spot Number oflisted 6 6 
Trade Volume (Y billion) 45.73 66.34 
Futures^ Number oflisted \_3 0 
Trade Volume (Y billion) 1,905.42 4,939.16 
Repurchase Number oflisted 5 6 
Trade Volume (Y billion) 6.32 84.57 
Source: Liu, Pei-Qiong. ZhoiiR Guo JiiiR Ji Da Qii Shi 19%. Commercial Press, 1996. 
^ Calciilatcd from statistical data up to October 31, 1995. 
^ Bond fiiliircs trading was suspended started from May 18, 1995. 
Causes of Lack of Liquidity 
Primary Market Practices 
The first cause of the illiquid secondary market is the lack of homogeneity in 
the stock of debt which reduces the amount of any one type of debt which is available 
for trading. The coupons and maturities offered in treasury debt varied from year to 
year. The segmentation effect created a thin secondary market. Secondly, the issuance 
of treasury bonds have been focused on individual investors rather than institutional 
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investors. Since individual investors usually hold the treasury bonds until maturity, the 
main participants in the secondary market are institutional investors. However, 
individual investors hold the majority of the outstanding treasury bonds. Third, the 
yield at issue is not related to secondary market yield. Due to linking of the coupon to 
deposit rates, and issuing at par, the Y T M of a treasury bond at issue may be either 
above or below the secondary market yield. I f the issue yield is below secondary 
market yields, the treasury bond sells, as the coupon is competitive by comparison with 
alternative returns on deposits and loans. But an issue yield less than secondary 
market yield inhibits secondary market trading as investors are reluctant to sell at a 
loss. Fourth, the primary issue is not distributed over the year. The lack of a regular 
issue calendar inhibits liquidity in two ways. On one hand, without a regular issue 
program, there cannot be a continual supply of short dated money market paper from 
which a short-end yield curve can develop. This inhibits money market development， 
reducing the supporting role the money market plays to the bond market. On the other 
hand, there are no new issues to act as a market benchmark. Typically as debt issues 
age，an increasing proportion is held by end-holder investment portfolios rather than 
trading portfolios. Fifth, the variety of maturity of treasury bond is limited. The 
market is dominated by 3- to 5-year species, short-term and long-term bonds are not 
enough to match liability and change in duration of portfolio. Sixth, accurate pricing 
of the treasury bonds is difficult because of the untypical method of coupon payment. 
The first cause of uncertainty is the correct basis on which to quote bond yields: 
payment of accumulated simple interest on maturity has led to bond prices being 
quoted on a current yield basis rather than a yield to maturity basis. The second cause 
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ofuncertainty is the inflation subsidy which made future payoff o f treasury bonds open 
to different expectations. Anyway, inflation subsidy was already abolished in 1996. 
Market Infrastructure 
The second group of causes concerns the supporting market infrastructure. 
First o f all, the money market does not assists bond market liquidity through the 
provision of funding for bond portfolios via either loans or repurchase agreements. 
Repurchase agreement (repos) can increase liquidity by enabling investors to quickly 
obtain funds without having to sell their bonds. Trading of repos in 1994 is estimated 
to have reached 314 billion yuan as described in Table V-3. This amounted to an 
estimated 10 percent ofbond trading volume in 1994. 
Tabic V-3: Tra(ling of Rcpurchasc Agreements in 1994 (Y hillion) 
Trading Centre Trading Value 
W u h a n Securities Trading Centre 160.0 
STAQS 290.0 
Shanghai Stock Exchange 63.0 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange 1.3 
Total 314.3 
Source: SEEC 
There are mainly four core deficiencies of the money market, in terms of its 
potential support to the bond market. First, the money market is geographically 
segmented which implies that funds in the provinces are unlikely to be available to 
finance bond transactions on one of the major exchanges. This inhibits the formation 
of an unified bond market. Second, the money market is institutionally segmented. 
Regulations exist to control which parties are permitted to transact and the maturities 
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that can be offered. Moreover, bank sub-branches manage their own liquidity on the 
basis oftheir allocated capital and credit. The lack of centralized liquidity management 
also acts as a factor preventing the development of a short-term yield curve. Third, 
interest rate ceilings on both loans and repos prevented the development of a short-
term yield curve since there is no regular supply of short-dated treasury bills to provide 
a liquid and low-risk instrument to act as a short-term benchmark. Fourth, The 
treasury risk management capability of banks and other financial institutions is very 
thin due to a lack of incentives to manage risk. Developing this capability will be 
hindered by the cumbersome reserves methodology of PBC.^^ Estimates of money 
market trading volumes and assets of users are available in Appendix Tables IX-4 and 
IX-5. 
42 World Bank. The Emerging Asian Bond Market: China. Washington, D.C.: World Bank 
Publication, June 1995, pp. 20-21. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE INTERNATIONAL BOND MARKET 
Foreign Part icipation in Ch ina 's Domestic Bond Marke t 
Unlike stock markets, money and bond markets in China remain closed to 
foreign investment. While the international experience suggests that foreign portfolio 
investment has been increasing the most rapidly, resource inflows to China have been 
increasingly skewed towards foreign direct investment (FDI), which accounted for 
more than two-thirds of the total net private investment flows to the country in 1993. 
The increase in private resource inflows to China parallels a global trend of 
rapidly increasing private resource inflows to emerging market economies. However, 
the composition of external investment flows to China is strikingly different from 
comparative countries.^'' This is illustrated in the following figures. 
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China 's Overseas Bond Issues 
History 
In 1987, China has begun to tap the international bond markets for much-
needed foreign exchange to bolster domestic economic expansion. It accessed the 
Eurobond market for the first time as a sovereign borrower. Since then, it has 
followed a gradual and methodical approach, borrowing more as its economy grows 
and as its exports increase. By first establishing its international credit ratings, China 
has successfully managed to launch a Euroyen issue in September 1993, a Dragon 
bond in October 1993, culmination in a $1 billion global bond issue in February 1994 
and a recent ¥60 billion Samurai issue. With strong capital demand and high 
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prospective investment returns, China is expected to remain a regular borrower in the 
international markets. The $1 billion global bond issues was the largest amount ever 
issued by China. These funds will be used to finance energy, transportation and 
communication projects. Besides, the raising of the China's debt rating by two US 
credit agencies, Moody's and Fitch has facilitated the global bond's issuance. 
The following table shows the China's foreign currency bonds issued 
overseas.44 
Tabic Vl-1: China's Foreign Currcncy Bonds Issued Overseas 
Date of Issue Issuing Authori ty Amount Term (Years) Market 
82 CITIC 10byen 12 ~ ~ T o k y o 
83 FlEC 5byen 10 — T o k y o 
8 4 BOC 20b yen W Tokyo 
85 — CITIC — 30b yen 10 Tokyo 
85 BOC 20b yen ^0 Tokyo 
85 B〇C DM 150 m 7 Frankfurt 
85 CITIC HK$ 300m 5 TTong Kong 
85 CITIC DM150 m 6 ~~Frankfurt 
85 BOC US$ 150m 10 Tokyo 
85 BOC 30 b yen 10 — Tokyo “ 
~ ~ ^ FlEC — 10 b yen 10 Tokyo — 
85 CITIC US$1Q0 m 10 — T o k y o 
86 SITC 25 b yen 10 — Tokyo — 
86 CITIC ~To b yen — 10 Tokyo — 
86 BOC US$ 20Qm 10 Tokyo — 
86 BOC HK$ 400 m ~ ~ 12 Tokyo ~ 
86 BOC ~ 20 b yen 10 Frankfurt 
86 CITIC US$ 50 m 7 Hong Kong 
86 GITIC 10 b yen — 10 Tokyo 
86 FlEC “ 20 b yen 10 — Singapore 
86 TITIC 10 b yen — 10 Tokyo 
87 ClTIC 30 b yen — 5 Tokyo 
87 CITIC 10 b yen 5 Singapore 
87 CITIC ~ 0 b yen — 10 Tokyo 
87 BOC US$ 200 m 一 10 Singapore 
87 FlEC 10byen 10 Tokyo 
87 B〇C 15 b yen 5 Tokyo 
87 GITIC US$ 50 m 5 ~Hong Kong 
87 BOC US$ 200 m 5 London 
87 MOF DM 300 m 5 Frankfurt ~ 
88 CITIC 15 b yen 5 — Luxembourg 
88 — B〇C 15 b yen 5.25 — Luxembourg 
88 GITIC 20 b yen 5 London 
88 SITC 15byen 7.25 Luxembourg 
44 "Chinese Bonds in the Introdiiclion ofForeign Capital." China Newsletter’ August 1989, pp.19-27. 
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88 |BankofCommunica t ion |HK$ 200 m | 5 | H o n g K o n g 
88 CITIC 1 5 b y e n 5.25 Singapore 
^ Bank of Communication US$100m 5 Singapore 
88 ~ ~ FIEC — 15bye rT " 10 Tokyo 
88 — TITIC — 1 0 b y e n “ 10 Tokyo ~ ~ 
89 B〇C 20b yen 10 ~~ Tokyo 
91 B〇C 20b yen 5 — Tokyo 
92 — B〇C ~ ~ 15byerT" 5 Tokyo 
92 B〇C US$0.15b 5 Singapore 
93 B〇C ~"15byen ~~ 5 “ Tokyo — 
93 B〇C 15byen 7 — T o k y o 
93 — B〇C — US$ O . 2 V 5 London 
94 BOC US$0.5b 5.2 New York 
CrriC: China Inteniational Trust and Investment Corporation 
FffiC: Fujian Investment Enterprise corporation 
BOC: Bank ofCh ina 
SrrC: Shanghai Investment & Trust Cor|ioration 
GITlC: Guangdong International Tnisl and Investiiieiil Corporation 
TITIC: Tianjian International Trust and Investment Corporation 
Remark:For the year 89 to 92, only those data for the BOC could be obtained 
Convertible Bonds and Bond Derivatives 
Chinese borrowers remain relatively inactive in convertible bonds and bonds 
with derivative elements. Only three issues have been launched: China Textile 
Machinery's $23 million equivalent of SFR-denominated 5 year convertible bond, in 
November 1993, and two separate 7 year US dollar bond issues, with a 'put' option, 
by Shandong Industrial Trust & Investment in July 1994 ($130 million) and September 
1994 ($150million). 
China has not been a major participant in overseas markets for bonds with 
derivative elements. Some engagements in derivatives by Chinese enterprises led to 
large loss-marking in 1994, as a result of which financial operations in international 
derivatives markets grew more tightly controlled. 
Issues Procedures 
The domestic organization of overseas bond issues still form a part of the 
annual credit plan, and part of the foreign borrowing quota. The allocation is 
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determined by the PBC. Approvals are also required by the State Administration of 
Exchange Control for medium- to long-term issues. Convertible securities are 
regulated by both the SAEC and the CSRC. 
China's international bond issues have been carried out by certain financial 
institutions comprising selected banks and those tmst and investment corporations 
authorized to engage in international operations.^^ 
Possible Problems with the Issues Procedures 
First, the domestic procedures do not ensure that proceeds from foreign bond 
issues eventually go to the projects with the highest returns. This is because the 
allocation of the ‘residual，quota among provinces requires distribution criteria and 
bargaining elements. On lending terms for overseas loans to eventual domestic 
borrowers is not clearly defined. 
Second, the issues procedures placed too much dependence on the 'windows' 
for international bond issuance. This is only preferable if all the windows have good 
credit rating which could result in cost-effectiveness. However, for those windows 
that have weak balance sheets a cost ineffectiveness could result. Moreover, the 
procedures can encourage back-door financing activities, such as inducing offshore 
borrowing by Chinese enterprises through their foreign subsidiaries. 
China's International Bond Issuers 
The following table shows the largest issuers of the China institution in the 
international bond market. 
42 World Bank. The Emerging Asian Bond Market: China. Washington, D.C.: World Bank 
Publication, June 1995, pp. 20-21. 
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Tabic Vl-2: Major Issiicrs of the China's International Bond 
Issuer No. of issues A m o u n t ($ mil l ion) 
People's Republic ofChina 5 2,196 
Bank ofChina 7 1,283 
China International Trust & Investment 3 6 ^ 
People's Construction Bank of China 5 ^ 
Guangdong International Trust & Inv. 2 3 ^ 
Source : "Asia/Pacific: C h i n a : Euromoney Handbook, September 1994. 
Up to 1994, only 10 domestic issuers can tap the international market, usually 
for project-based investment . These 10 authorized institutions had been referred to as 
the ‘10 windows.' The 'windows' act essentially as intermediaries, who on-lend to 
domestic end-users. Among the 'windows', CITIC and the Bank of China (BOC) 
have been the most active. In the late 1980s, these were the only two institutions 
issuing debt. 
Trend of International Issuance 
As mentioned before, China's access to international capital markets has 
expanded substantially in recent years. The annual volume of new overseas bond 
issues has grown remarkably fast, expanding from less than $200 million a year, on 
average, over 1989-91, to over $2 billion per year for 1992-94. 
In terms of currencies, China's overseas bond issues have been concentrated in 
two currencies, the Japanese yen and the US dollar. However, as the yen becomes 
stronger and the dollar's interest rate becomes smaller, the new issues have shifted 
away from yen towards US dollars. The following figures illustrated the situation.^^ 
42 World Bank. The Emerging Asian Bond Market: China. Washington, D.C.: World Bank 
Publication, June 1995, pp. 20-21. 
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In terms of rate structure, recent historically low interest rates in major markets 
led to a concentration of new issues in fixed rates (70 percent). The average maturity 
of new bond issues has increased every year since 1 9 9 1 " 
Figure VT-3: International Bond Issiics by Chinese Borrowers (by Type & Maturity) 
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42 World Bank. The Emerging Asian Bond Market: China. Washington, D.C.: World Bank 
Publication, June 1995, pp. 20-21. 
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In 1994, new US dollar bonds had an average maturity of 9.3 years, compared 
to 5 years in 1992. Yen bonds in 1994 averaged close to seven years, compared to 
around five years in 1992 and 1993. 
Choices of Markets for Issuance 
The choice of specific markets is based on the combined considerations of: 
relative prevailing rates; listing costs; issue and listing processes (for example, the 
Euromarket is usually considered to have a simpler listing process); general market 
recognition and reception (Asian markets are relatively favorable to China); 
diversification; and market l iquidi ty, 
42 World Bank. The Emerging Asian Bond Market: China. Washington, D.C.: World Bank 
Publication, June 1995, pp. 20-21. 
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CHAPTER VII 
DEBT MANAGEMENT OF CHINA 
Causes of the Mexico Crisis in 1995^^ 
In the first quarter of 1995 Mexico found itself in the grip of an intense 
financial panic. Foreign investors fled Mexico despite very high interest rates on 
Mexican securities, an undervalue currency, and financial indicators that pointed to 
long-term solvency. The fundamental conditions of the Mexican economy cannot 
account for the entire crisis. The crisis was due to unexpected shocks that occurred in 
1994, and the inadequate policy response to those shocks. In the aftermath of the 
March assassination the exchange rate experienced a nominal devaluation of around 10 
percent and interest rates increased by around 7 percentage points. However, the 
capital outflow continued. The policy response to this was to maintain the exchange 
rate rule，and to prevent further increases in interest rates by expanding domestic credit 
and by converting short-term peso-denominated government liabilities falling due into 
dollar-denominated bonds. A fall in international reserves and an increase in short-
term dollar-denominated debt resulted. The government simply ended up illiquid, and 
therefore financially vulnerable. Illiquidity exposed Mexico to a self-fulfilling panic. 
To sum up, the causes of the Crisis was due to: 
• the foreign capital inflows into the country was mainly short-term equities and 
bond purchase; 
• negative current account deficit; 
• the liquid reserve was smaller than the short-term liabilities; 
49 NBER Working Papcr Scries. Working Paper No. 5142. The Collapse of The Mexican PESO: 
What Have Wc Learned? Jiinc 1995. p.l. 
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• three shocks - the Colosio assassination in March; the resignation of the Deputy 
Attorney General in November and the rumors surrounding devaluation in early 
December 
• inappropriate policy response towards the capital outflow 
An Analysis of the China 's Current Situation 
Compositions of Foreign Capital Flow into the Country 
As mentioned before, while the international experience suggests that foreign 
portfolio investment has been increasing the most rapidly, the resource inflows to 
China have been increasingly skewed towards foreign direct investment (FDI), which 
accounted for more than two-thirds of the total net private investment flows to the 
country in 1 9 9 3 , Therefore, the foreign capitals that currently present in China is less 
liquid than those in the other countries. Besides, money and bond markets in China 
remain closed to foreign investment. This is favorable as China still does not have 
effective market instruments to conduct efficient policy actions, such as sterilization, to 
deal with large inflows of capital. 
Political Risk 
In China, the main event that are expected to occur in the near future will be 
the death of Mr. Deng Xiao-Ping. This is what has been expected for years and so 
will not cause much shock to the foreign investors. 
Besides, the government will not be weakened by Mr. Deng's death, since the 
need to continue economic growth means the different factions may have little choice 
42 World Bank. The Emerging Asian Bond Market: China. Washington, D.C.: World Bank 
Publication, June 1995, pp. 20-21. 
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but accommodate each other. The division of labour would likely be the same as it is 
now. The reformist vice-premier, Zhu Rongji, will continue to oversee economic 
policy. Jiang Zemin will remain as head of the Communist Party and play a role in 
foreign affairs. And the conservative premier, Li Peng, will run the government and 
also involve himselfin foreign affairs.^' 
Social stability will remain precariously balanced: economic growth has 
brought higher standards of living and more choice, but inflation and unemployment 
are undermining morale. Worried about widening social unrest, Beijing is likely to 
continue a high-growtlVhigh-inflation strategy. 
On the whole, policymaking will probably slow down until after Mr. Deng dies. 
But the situation should not last for too long as the government has to tackle the 
problems of inflation, unemployment and the reform of the SOEs. Besides, the 
direction of economic policymaking will not be changed in the near future. 
Current Account Balance 
Apart from 1993, the Current Account Balance of China has been maintaining 
at a positive level. This has contributed a lot to the foreign reserves of the country 
which in turn can increase the confidence of the foreign investors in China. 
Foreign Reserves and Short-Term Liabilities 
The following table shows the types ofbond, grouped by maturities, issued and 
the foreign reserves of the government between 1986 to 1994. 
51 The Economic Intelligence Unit. 'Waiting and watching, China." Business Asia. 16 January 
1996, pp. 3-4. 
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Tabic VIM: Country's Total Foreign Dcbt 
^ e a r Total ($b) Long-term % of total Short-term % of total Foreign FR - STL 
Liabilities Liabilities (STL) Reserves (FR) 
1986 2 1 4 . 8 ^ 167.U^-— T7.8 47.69 一 22.2 ~ 20.72 -26.9厂 
T987 302.05— 244.85 s l l 57.2 18.9 29.23 -27.97 
T ^ 400.03— 326.96 ― ― 81.7 73.07 18 .3 “― 33.72 -39.35 
l 9 ^ 412.9厂 370.32 89.7 42.67 10.3 55.5 12.83 
T ^ 525.4厂 457.79"~~ 87.1 67.66 ~~12.9 110.93 — 43.27 
T ^ 605.61— 502.57 83.0 103.04 17.0~~ 217.12 114.08 
T ^ 693.21~ 584.75―― 84.4 108.46 15.6 194.43 85.97 
1993 835.73 700.27 83.8 135.46 ~ 16.2 211.99 76.53— 
1994| 928.06 ]"^^8^791 | 88.8 104.15 11.2 516.2 412.05 
Source: Statistical Year Book ofChina, 1995 
From the table, we see that the ratio of the government's foreign outstanding 
debts with longer maturities have been increasing. Besides, since 1989, the country's 
foreign reserve has been in excess of the foreign short-term liabilities. Both can reduce 
the risk of default on payment of short-term liabilities perceived by investors. This is 
illustrated in Figure VI1-1. 
Figure V1I-1: A Comparison of thc Foreign Liabilities and Foreign Reserves 
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Foreign Debt 
Values Scored for Various Risk-Evaluation Indexes 
The following table shows the scores of various foreign debt risk-evaluation 
indexes of the country in the past ten years. 
Tabic VII-2: Foreign Dcbt for Risk 
— Y e a r Debt Service Ratio (20 - 25)* Liabil i ty Ratio (20)* Foreign Debt Ratio (100)* 
1985 — ^ 8 ~ ~ — 5.6 53.4 
1986 — 20.3 7.8 70.0 
1987 12.7 9.4 75.2 
1988 — 6.3 — 10.0 84.4 
1989 8.0 11.5 一 83.1 
1990 8.5 14 8 87.0 
1991 — 1 5 " — 一— 15.0 87.0 
— 1 9 9 2 — T . 3 “ 14.1 — 90.7 
— 1 9 9 3 1 . 7 — “ 14.0 一 94.5 
1994 9—:1 17.6 I 77.8 
Remark: 1. Represented safety level and all unit shown are in %. 
2. Debt Service Ratio refers to the repayment of principal and interest on foreign debt to foreign 
exchange receipts ofexport.s and services. 
3. Liability Ratio refers lo lhe ratio of foreign dcbt to GNP. 
4. Foreign Debt Ratio refers to ratio of foreign debt to foreign exchange receipts for exports and 
services. 
Source: Statistical Yearbook ofChina 1995. 
All the indexes show that the foreign debt of the country is within safety limit. 
The Ratio ofForeign Debt Issue to the Government's Total Debt Issue. 
The following table shows the structure of the government debt financing 
between 1990 to 1993. 
Tabic VII-3: Government Debt Finance (O.lb yuan) 
YEAR Total PeTT Govt' Domestic Foreign — Total Domestic Foreign People's 
Incurred Bonds & Debts Retirement Bond Debt Bank Loans 
Treasury Billls of Debt & 
lnt' Payment 
“ 1990 —^~375.45 197.24 178.21 190.4 113.75 68.21 8.44 — 
1991 461.4 2 ^ 2 1 180.13 — 246.8 156.69 80.22 — 9.89 — 
_ 1992 669.68 W67n 208.91 — 438.57 342.42 80.26 — 15.89 — 
199s| 739.22 381.32 "~~f 357.9 336.22 224.3 89.22 22.7 
Source: Statistical Year Book ofChina, 1995. 
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The foreign debt of the country has been growing. The foreign debt in 1992 is 
6 times that of 1979. The continuous economic reform in China resulted in huge 
foreign capital inflow into the country. Besides, the upgrade of the China's bond 
rating has increased the attractiveness of the country to the foreign investors. 
Conclusion: The Possibility of Financial Crisis in Ch ina 
After the analysis, we fmd nothing similar between the financial and political 
situations of China and those of Mexico. Thus, we do not think the crisis that 
occurred in Mexico would happen in China today. However, there are something that 
are worth to be considered. 
First of all, in China, the growth rate of the foreign debt is consistently higher 
than that of the GDP of the country. I f this condition persists, it will eventually 
increase the default risk perceived by investors which in turn will result in a demand for 
higher interest rate for further investment into the country. Besides, from 1979 to 
1994, there were 22 countries giving loan to the government. The duration of the loan 
ranged from 15 to 30 years, with a grace period of 7 to 10 years. Therefore, 90's is 
the peak time for debt repayment. 
Second, the China's abundant foreign exchange reserves and healthy debt 
position rely in great part on two factors: trade surpluses and inward direct investment. 
The problem is that these inward flows of foreign cash have already peaked and will 
now decline, while outflows to pay off foreign debt are not. As for trade, the rate of 
growth in China's exports has been falling steadily for some time, and has been 
negative so far this year. China must continue to cut import tariffs and reduces export 
subsidies, and even ifit opts to devalue the renminbi to stimulate exports, trade deficits 
will be the pattern of the future. Moreover, there are already signs of concern. In 
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March, an major American rating agency, Thomson BankWatch, cut China's sovereign 
rating from A- to BBB+, citing strong concerns over slowing economic reforms and 
quickening political tensions. If China fails in its delicate reform policies, its credit will 
fall and funding costs rise, even as it needs more funds.^^ 
Third, the mandatory method of bond placement and the face-value 
stabilization intervention undermined the purpose behind the 1981 shift from financing 
the whole deficit through money creation. The bond issue stemmed from the desire to 
reduce inflation by making fiscal policy independent of monetary policy. With bonds 
absorbing household and enterprise saving, an increase in government expenditure that 
widened the budget deficit would not cause a corresponding increase in the (reserve) 
money supply. However, the mandatory method of bond placement strengthened 
enterprises' requests for bank loans. Enterprises claimed that the involuntary 
withdrawals of their working capital to purchase bonds were causing them cash flow 
problems. So the banking system transformed most of the deficit into money supply 
growth, with the enterprises acting as intermediates. 
The face-value stabilization interventions also resulted in a net increase in the 
high-power money supply because the local governments would cover their losses with 
loans from the local banks, which, in turn, received more central bank deposits. 
52 The Economic Intelligence Unit. ‘、As good as its bond.” Business China. 15 April 1996, pp.l-2. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FOREIGN INVESTORS 
With some understanding of the China's international bond market and its 
financial situations, we would, from the point of view of foreign investors, try to make 
some comments on the attractiveness of the China's overseas bonds. Our discussion 
would only cover a general view rather than base on individual issue. Furthermore, 
due to the limited inforination, we will focus only on sovereignty issue rather than 
issues from corporations and financial institutions. 
RiskofDefa i i l t 
Credibility 
When compared with the other developing countries, China has a better 
credibility record in the international debt market. This is not without reasons. For 
example, in the syndicated loans market, China has not performed any loan 
rescheduling in the past. In addition, China's credibility was also enhanced by the fully 
repayment in October 1992 of the DM 30 million international bond issued in October 
1987. Recently, large volume of syndicated loans were allocated to Chinese 
borrowers. This reflects good credit perceived by risk-conscious international 
commercial banks. In contrast, other developing countries like Poland, Argentina, 
South Africa and Philippines had defaulted on or had rescheduled their foreign debts to 
commercial banks. Therefore, based on credibility, China should be a good choice for 
those emerging bond market lovers. 
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Macroeconomics Situation 
The ability of the borrower to pay back principal and interests is certainly an 
investor's great concern. The repayment ability of a country is closely related to its 
macroeconomics situation. Some of the factors have already been discussed in the 
previous chapter. First of all, the majority of foreign capital inflow in China is FDI. 
This contributes to a stable economic situation since FDI is less liquid and so capital 
flight which will hinder economic growth is not likely to occur. Second, since 1993, 
the current account balance of China has been maintaining at a positive level. The 
surplus was 1.9% of GDP for 1995, compares favorably with deficits for East Asia 
averaging 1.5%. This indicates that China has the ability to earn foreign reserve which 
is needed to make repayment for its foreign debt. Third, since 1989, the amount of 
foreign reserves of China has exceeded its short-term liabilities. This further proves 
the repayment ability of China. Fourth, the debt service ratio, liability ratio and foreign 
debt ratio of China are all below the risky level. Therefore, China is managing its debt 
in a proper way. 
However, there are some issues which would give a negative image on China's 
economic situation. These are the problems of inflation and the reform of the SOEs. 
Although the inflation was eased from the peak of21.7% in 1994 to beIow 10% in the 
first quarter of 1996, the situation is not so simple that we can say the problem is 
solved. In fact, the inflation in China is linked to the problem o fSOE reform. In 1995, 
number of unprofitable SOEs rose to about 40% of the total. Most of the SOEs lack 
financial resources and triangular debt is an annoying problem. In order to finance the 
SOEs to ease their capital shortage, the China government needs to loose its credit 
plan. However, because of the incomplete reform in the banking sector, the amount of 
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credit given does not usually keep alongside with the amount of saving deposits. As a 
result，money supply would be increased if credit plan is relaxed. In turn, inflation 
would also be increased. As SOEs are providing most of the employment in the 
country, China cannot simply let the SOEs go bankruptcy. However, under the 
present system, helping SOEs through credit would induce inflation. Therefore, SOE 
reform is an important problem the China government needs to deal with immediately. 
In reality, the SOE reform cannot be isolated. Successful reforms in other sectors like 
the banking sector are also required. With a better infrastructure in every system, 
China can then determine a satisfactory balance point between inflation and 
unemployment rate. Then, a more stable economic situation would be obtained. 
Furthermore, as stated before, the inward flows of foreign cash have begun to 
decline, while outflows to pay off foreign debt are not. Together with the pessimistic 
figure in export growth, our view towards China economy is not a pure positive one. 
Credit Rat ing 
Credit rating is a measure of the safety of return of principal and payment of 
interest. More specifically, credit rating is an assessment of the country's willingness 
and economic ability to honor its external obligations under the terms of the issue. 
China was given a credit rating of above-investment grade by all major rating 
agencies. The country's sovereign rating was upgraded to A3 by Moody's in 
September 1993. This was due to the strong potential to attract foreign investment, 
low external debt burden and the likely ‘soft-landing’ for successful transition to a 
more advanced market economy. At the same time, Moody's rated Argentina, Brazil, 
Mexico, Venezuela, Turkey as well as Hungary below investment grade. Chile, 
Colombia, India and Indonesia were at investment grade but below that of China. 
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However, three Asian emerging economies enjoyed higher ratings. They were Korea, 
Malaysia and Thailand (Table IX-6). After that, a similar upgrading was given to three 
major financial institutions. They are BOC, CITIC and PCBC (Table IX-7). 
However, in April 1995, Moody's cut the long-term debt ratings o f PCBC, 
alongside three other China banks, to Baal from A3. PCBC was also given an E-plus 
financial strength rating by the agency in August. That means the bank is considered 
weak in terms of financial strength. Nevertheless, among the developing countries, 
Chinese borrowers are enjoying better ratings about which investors should concern. 
Rate of Return 
Compared with other developing countries, the interest rate of China's 
international bonds is relatively low. In 1994, China enjoyed lower spreads than India 
or Thailand and also countries outside the region, such as Hungary and Mexico (before 
its crisis) (Table XT1I-1). However, the small dragon Korea was better than China in 
this aspect. The favourable terms enjoyed by China until recently reflect in large part 
its good macroeconomics performance. After the 1994 Mexico crisis, developing 
countries as a whole suffered some decline in their terms. In the case of China, there 
were some deterioration in secondary-market prices on bonds,、Anyway, to comply 
with the risk-return theory, China's overseas bonds are perceived as safer and so the 
return is lower than those of other developing countries. 
53 Since China's overseas bond issues are not traded on the exchanges, but are traded largely over the 
counter between major internaional investors, thc measurement of the tme deterioration in these terms 
is difficult. 
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Tabic V1II-1: Avcragc Spread on Floating Rate Bond Issues^^  (Basis Points Above LIBOR) 
Coun t r i e s—199T~T992 T 9 9 3 ~ I s ^ 
"China 5 0 ^ " " "^^ 54 56~™~" 
Hungary n.a. n.a. n.a. 150 
India n.a. n.a. n.a. 218 
Korea 36 56 50 35 
Mexico n.a. 250 313 139 
Thailand n.a. 43 43 89 
Source?^S?^I^T5^J^riEc: 
Conclusion 
On the whole, the credibility of China is better than those o f the other 
developing countries. As China requires large amount of foreign capital for its 
numerous infrastructure projects, it would try its best to avoid debt repudiation which 
would be very harmful to its trade relationship and future ability to obtain external 
financing. 
The current ability of debt repayment of China is pretty good as indicated by 
several financial ratios. However, there is still a long way to go before a stable 
economic situation can be reached. Several important issues like the SOE reform and 
inflation need the China government to put into more efforts. The amount o f F D I and 
exports in the future are not very optimistic. Therefore, in the long run, the situation is 
not very clear. As the maturity of China's international bonds became longer and 
longer (Figure VI-3), foreign investors should be aware of the increased risk of their 
Chinese's bond-holding. 
On the political side, the situation is quite stable. It is thought that power has 
been successfully transferred to the third generation leaders in China. The smooth 
transfer of power is critical to the economic stability. On the other hand, China made a 
54 An Adequate sct of comparable data for each year and country, in terms of currency of issue and 
maturity does not exist, and the tabic is therefore based on a specific bond type, the floating rate bond, 
for medium and long bonds. 
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great advancement in the international relationship. On 25 April 1996, Russian 
President Boris Yeltsin and Chinese President Jiang Zemin signed agreements to 
cooperate on energy and space exploration. China's external economic and political 
relations are important considerations in its foreign bonds' credibility evaluation. 
Good relationship with other countries is a positive indication of China's future 
economic development and its credibility. 
In conclusion, China's international bonds should be a good choice for short-
term investment, although they offer a lower coupon rate. For investors interested in 
long-term investment, China's bonds should also be considered. Those investors 
should place their eye-sight in future business with China rather than the bond's 
intrinsic value. Even if the investment is risky and not so profitable, it may be 
worthwhile in terms of building long-term relationships with China. By the way, 
foreign investors should evaluate their own position before making their investments, 
such as risk-bearing capacity and investment horizon. Their decision ought to base on 
the whole investment portfolio rather than individual investment. 
Although we solely discuss the government bonds here, it is also useful for the 
evaluation of non-government overseas bonds. Apart from the microeconomics 
environment, non-government bonds are also susceptible to the effect of 
macroeconomics environment of the country. For example, changes in government 
policy and the whole economy will affect the operating performance of the issuers. In 
addition, country's creditworthiness will confine the credit rating of individual issuers. 




Tabic rX-l: Treasury Bond Issues 
Issue Ycar Maturity Coupon Ratc Issuc sizc Comparable Deposit 
^ c ^ (rmb b) Rate (%) 
— 1 9 8 1 10-yr 8 4.9 6.84 
— 1 9 8 2 10-yr 8 4.4 7.92 
— 1 9 8 3 10-yr 8 4.2 7.92 
198 4 1 ^ 8 4 J 7 ^ 
198 5 5 ^ 9 6A ^ 
198 6 ^ [0 0 ^ 
— 1987 5-yr 10 6.3 9.36 — 
— 1988 3-yr 10 9.2 8.28 
1989 3-yr 14 5.6 13.14 
— 1990 3-yr 14 9.3 11.88 
— 1991 3-yr 10 19.9 8.28 
— 1 9 9 2 (1) 5-yr 10.5 13.3 9 
— 1 9 9 2 (2) 3-yr 9.5 26.2 8.28 
1993 (1) ^ n ^ ^ 12.24 
1993 (2) ^ l ^ M |0 13.86 
— 1 9 9 4 (1) 6-mo 9.8 5 9 — 
— 1 9 9 4 (2) 1-yr 11.98 10 10.98 
—1994 (3) 2-yr 13 27 11.7 
1994 (4) 3 ^ n ^ 50 12.24 
Source: Zhang, Yi-Chen. and Yu, Da. Thina's Emerging Securities Market." The Columbia 
Journal of World Business. Summer 1994, p. 116. 
62 
Table IX-2: Tradinji； Volume of Sccuritics (Y million) 
zirzzzmrzzzrzzznzTTTr7??rzzi5^?z^!T^i?^i?rzm^5?^!zzz7i^?mzzi5??z!zm^i5^?zz 
�T.i,ejisu;—'iio.n.:is. 2,420^85…….27l26.'00……‘ri"593.'53……..55:6..17/:^8……1¾¾¾').¾ 83/056.49…‘. 
Treasury Bills 2,383.09 2,094.17 10,488.64 33,954.79 105,023.65 83,017.37 
Fiscal Bonds 
SUite Construction Bonds 14.84 4.66 
Key SUate Constnjction Bonds 37.76 16.99 9.75 29.49 
Special Government Bonds 
Indexed Bonds 1,090.48 3,033.00 3,233.77 39.12 
National Investment Bonds 5,160.55 1,468.97 
National Investment Corporation Bonds 8.61 25.67 216.24 3,159.45 543.24 
Key Enterprise Bonds 2.62 
Capital Construction Bonds 5.99 25.67 216.24 
Financial Institution Bonds 12.00 69.58 46.11 46.22 781.47 3,501.92 2,224.77 
Local Enterprise Bonds 91.63 115.87 79.09 105.58 2,463.28 12,822.93 23,450.92 
Short-Term Enterprise 0.00 0.00 6.48 34.31 1,014.29 3,080.21 3,002.09 
Negotiable Certificiites 
Subtotal dobt seciiiities" 103.63 2.606.30 2,274.90 11,830.98 41,708.80 135,982.48 113,746.48 
Enterprise Sfock^ 8.00 9.22 23.15 1,812.37 8,674.00 136,248.00 733,406.00 
Ji imbo CDs 0,00 12.85 12.16 41.59 102.27 278.61 307.42 
Total all securities 1 1 1.63 2.628.37 2，310.2丨 13,684.94 50,485.07 272,509.09 847,459.90 
Source: Slate Council Sccurilics Committee, circular dated August 1994. 
a Bond trading is estimated on a gross basis. 
b Enterprise stock trading includes officially recognized centres only. 
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Tabic DC-3: Sccuritics Tradinj; on thc Shanghai Exchange in 1994 (Turnover, Y million) 
Equities Trcasiivy Bonds 
A Shares B Shares Spot Repurchase Futures Funds Total 
Jan-94 29,436 1,867 994 92 2,528 62.5 34,979 
Fcb-94 7,389 353 1,461 3 360 17.7 9,584 
Mar-94 57,517 727 2,551 1 2,781 246.9 63,824 
Apr-94 30,397 579 2,661 36 11,305 111.7 45,089 
May-94 21,567 985 3,464 312 20,828 58.3 47,214 
Jun-94 9,726 690 2,937 856 64,644 33.8 78,886 
JuI-94 7,204 425 3,136 562 101,027 54 112,409 
Aug-94 147,007 1,448 6,376 426 121,141 3,349.6 279,747 
Scp-94 149,589 1,136 4,512 384 123,285 5,256.8 284,163 
Oct-94 54,942 927 3,499 656 56,620 1,695.9 118,340 
Nov-94 28,405 1,049 6,592 1,156 513,127 773.9 551,103 
Dcc-94 19,495 577 7,545 1,833 888,425 469.5 918,344 
Jan-95 4,579 446 5,173 1,567 1,436,064 89 1,489,129 
OOOOOOOI3000CmOa>JOOOOOOOOOCOCOOOnCKCOOCnaQCCiOOOOOnC<CgrouOOC*r,n>:r»:c i rr.l rt« U:Ca:Kl-KUCr(CVa:n:• :r•-•-m-r.-.-.-. n-n.-rrKn^ r. ^ . r“m~Km~nrK“~n~KKm~^KKrw-Kn~m^rmm^n^n^m~nm~m~m~rm~rmym~mmm~m~m>n~wnnn~n^  
Source: Shanghai Scciirities Exchange: Mon t h l y Markel Statistics. 
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Tabic rX-4: Monthly Transaction Voliimc in thc Interbank Market (Y billion) 
Ycar Month State Pcrccnt of OlluT Perccnt of Non-bank^^ Percent of All 
Banks" Total H;inks^^ Total Finnncial Total Financial 
Institutions Institutions 
1990 foVai 3,i2O.'96 
1991 Total 5,144.48 













1993 January 803.14 7.50 50.73 861.36 
February 779.35 7.39 53.44 840.18 
March 775.61 7.26 56.81 839.67 
April 753.32 7.36 61.44 822.12 
May 731.16 7.23 58.99 797.38 
June 677.43 7.61 82.37 767.40 
July 580.45 5.97 53.57 639.99 
August 529.59 4.04 43.74 577.37 
September 602.08 4.35 43.75 650.18 
October 719.84 4.20 42.64 766.68 
November 896.84 4.05 43.87 944.75 
December 979.71 4.96 42.47 1,027.14 
Total 8,828.50 92.6 71.92 0.80 633.79 6.60 9,534.21 
1994 January 138.65 5.30 110.05 253.99 
February 135.41 4.87 111.93 252.20 
March 135.84 5.09 I 16.45 257.38 
April 138.78 4.90 123.31 266.99 
May 135.30 5.13 127.31 267.75 
June 125.65 6.51 134.47 266.62 
July 126.91 6.69 133.99 267.59 
August 128.91 6.74 134.16 269.81 
September 135.72 7.88 136.81 280.41 
October 133.45 7.00 136.44 276.89 
Totar 1,334.62 50.2 60.11 2.26 1,264.90 47.6 2,659.63 
A»^W^WWV*>*^y^yV»*^VS*1"^»N*»**»*«*NWV»*»V»*»«*»*«**»**»**«*»*iW*«*»*«*»V«*W»*«*»*Z»*«*,»*»^»»»*»p*»»**»»**»«»*«»»«»*»%*«*^«*»*»«W«*»"«*»*«N*»**«»S*»*V*»**«V*»**»**»**«*»*«*»**»**«*»*«*»S<»*»WSA<*»*V*W«**»W»V»N^»*«»»«W*»**»**«^«*WVWV*rf*»N*»*»VW»*«*WWVWWWWWWVVW^WWWWWWS 
Source: SEEC, 1995. 
a State Banks include ICBC, ABC, BOC. PBOC, BOCOM and CITIC Industrial Bank, 
b Other Banks includc non-stale-owncd commcrcial banks and regional banks, 
e Data on Olher Banks and Non-bank Financial Institutions available from 1993. 
d Non-bank Financial Institutions include rural and urban co-operative credit agencies, trust and 
investment companies and accounting firms, 
e January to October only. 
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Tabic DC-5: Assets of Financial Institutions Engaged in thc Interbank Market (Y billion) 
*^AA»AAA»*<M»«>«iAAA*»^A*»AAA~A^»«»*~*<»A«»»«A<«»»AA^»«»*»>*»»»»«_»M_«>^«W"#w»*»»»«»«».«»»«»J»»_»A»»jW»«*»«>»«»«»«»«»<W»«»A«»««»-«»»W^p»«<W>»*»AWWWWW»*«»«J««jW>»<WJWW»>~«L*_W>~^AA^t_W»>AAAAAA_<»^-*><M»*A^»W>AAAA»«»M^AAA*AAA»«»*JWW»«kAAAAAAAAAA^W»OA*»*A*~» 
Year Quarter State Perccnt Otlu r Bank Pcrceiit Non-bank Pcrccnt of Total* 
Assets Bank ofTotal Assets ofTotal Financial Total 
Institutions Assets 
""i990 Q1 i"626!62 368.08 'i"994.Tl•••.. 
Q2 1,697.94 396.66 2,094.60 
Q3 1,754.13 410.18 2,164.30 
Q4 1,998.20 159.65 2,157.85 
Total 7,076.90 1,334.57 8,411.46 
1991 Q1 2,028.58 533.80 2,562.38 
Q2 2,093.53 530.75 2,624.28 
Q3 2,229.06 540.17 2,769.23 
Q4 2.479.10 865.97 3,345.07 
Total 8,830.27 2,470.70 11300.97 
1992 Q1 2,494.51 630.11 3,124.62 
Q2 2,657.51 698.16 3,355.67 
Q3 2.750.21 763.08 3,513.29 
Q4 3.000.86 848.83 3,849.68 
Total 10,903.09 2,940.17 13,843.26 
1993 Q1 3,009.85 45.84 960.69 4,016.38 
Q2 2,975.65 50.95 1,021.11 4,047.71 
Q3 3,044.44 52.52 1,023.64 4,120.60 
Q4 3,498.02 66.40 1,127.23 4,691.65 
Total 12,527.97 74.23 215.71 1.28 4,132.67 24.49 16,876.34 
1994 Q1 3,495.72 71.32 1.070.05 4,637.09 
Q2 3,741.94 119.42 1,321.96 5,183.32 
Q3 4.307.06 143.32 1,422.85 5,873.24 
Total" 11,544.72 73.56 334.06 2.13 3,814.86 24.31 15,693.65 
TrmncwTmnrgmrpnrBjt>cptj:a3CipcionQrjoooQCg>yit «"«• «r rr<rrr• r» ^ rrrm rr •'• •.« r»-• • _ • •-. r.rrrr» r*:*Tra t w-rw w:» » *電(• »•^*mc^CK>Jcr^^cocK：K<^*-r:•：K•«：TKJCKK^oncKaJC^¾3CC^oc^3Cg^3rK^r-g«^Qr«¾^KJ0C^O0OCKJOOOOl¾30^J3O0OOtK^3OCK^:«¾MC^3Oooo«¾JOOOOOOOOOOOO0o0ooot 
Source: SEEC, 1995. 
a Totals for 1990-1992 include only Slate Bank Assets and Non-bank Financial Institutions Assets, 
b January-September only. 
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Tabic rX-6: Sovcrcij^ii Rating of Sclcctcd Developing Countries (1994) 
Countries iMoo(l;)''s Standard and Poors 
Investment Gradc 
Chile Baa2 BBB+ (1) 
China A3 BBB (2) 
Colombia Bal BBB- (2) 
Cypms ii.a. AA- (1) 
Czech Republic Baa2 BBB+ (2) 
Greece Baa3 BBB-(1) 
Indonesia Baa3 BBB- (2) 
Korea, Rep. of A1 A+ (3) 
Malaysia A2 A (2) 
Malta A2 A (1) 
Portugal A1 AA-(1) 
South Africa Baa3 BB(2) 
Thailand A2 A-(1) 
Below Investment Gradc 
Argentina B1 BB-(2) 
Brazil B2 n.a. 
Hungary Bal BB+(1) 
India Ba2 BB+(1) 
Mexico Ba2 BB+ (2) 
Philippines Ba3 BB- ( I ) 
Slovakia n.a. BB-(1) 
Trinidad & Tobago Ba2 n.a. 
Turkey Ba3 B+(1) 
Unigiiay Bal BB+(1) 
Venezuela Ba2 B+ (3) 
•^^IW^>»^lVWVW«^»*»VW^lWVVW"^»»•^W^»«WVW»«»^^*^»«>«^•»•一一》«»«^»^"«W一^»一《^,,V^W^•^»一《^"«^"..,,•W«^一《»«•»^•"«l»,一《•«*»VW«•W«»«lW^»>^»N^"^»*•W»^W«»«^»VW«»^»«^ »^^W«•»^»»^W^^*»«V»%^•*N^•»«^»*^•^«^WV^^»«»«»^»«»WWVW•^•^»^•^W*^••^W^•»^NWVW«A«^A>V 
Source: World Bank 
Notes: (1) Stable outlook 
(2) Positive outlook 
(3) Negative outlook 
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Table IX-7: Credit Ratings of Chinese Borrowers 
^J•J^AA**^•J>***>^•AA*^^***^AAMA•*•AMA^J•^•>*^J>^^>JiJ•^J^J^^^•J^•*^MM>J^^^^•>J^M^^^^^^•^^^^^•^),,>^»^M,,,,•^J>,^^,办••J^^^^•^^^^^^^^*^J^,*^^J•>^•^•^•^^•^^^*•^^^^•^•^•^*>*^*^^^^^^•^^^^^^•^>^^*^^*•*^^^^•^*•^^^^^^^*^•^^^^^^^^^•^^>^*^*>•^>^^^^^•^^*^^*>^*>»•^>^^^***"^>^*^*>^*^^^*"^ 
Announccmcnt datc Issuer Full Namc Listing .?Ji!}.n5.!^ }.f^ .^..^ P.fL?*.9£r.?. Moody's 
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